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Abstract Static program analysis, once seen primarily as a tool for optimising programs, is now increasingly
important as a means to provide quality guarantees about programs. One measure of quality is the extent to
which programs respect the privacy of user data. Differential privacy is a rigorous quantified definition of
privacy which guarantees a bound on the loss of privacy due to the release of statistical queries. Among the
benefits enjoyed by the definition of differential privacy are compositionality properties that allow
differentially private analyses to be built from pieces and combined in various ways. This has led to the
development of frameworks for the construction of differentially private program analyses which are
private-by-construction. Past frameworks assume that the sensitive data is collected centrally, and
processed by a trusted curator. However, the main examples of differential privacy applied in practice - for
example in the use of differential privacy in Google Chrome’s collection of browsing statistics, or Apple’s
training of predictive messaging in iOS 10 -use a purely local mechanism applied at the data source, thus
avoiding the collection of sensitive data altogether. While this is a benefit of the local approach, with
systems like Apple’s, users are required to completely trust that the analysis running on their system has
the claimed privacy properties.
In this position paper we outline some key challenges in developing static analyses for analysing
differential privacy, and propose novel abstractions for describing the behaviour of probabilistic programs
not previously used in static analyses.
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Abstract. Static program analysis, once seen primarily as a tool for
optimising programs, is now increasingly important as a means to pro-
vide quality guarantees about programs. One measure of quality is the
extent to which programs respect the privacy of user data. Diﬀerential AQ1
privacy is a rigorous quantiﬁed deﬁnition of privacy which guarantees
a bound on the loss of privacy due to the release of statistical queries.
Among the beneﬁts enjoyed by the deﬁnition of diﬀerential privacy are
compositionality properties that allow diﬀerentially private analyses to
be built from pieces and combined in various ways. This has led to the AQ2
development of frameworks for the construction of diﬀerentially private
program analyses which are private-by-construction. Past frameworks
assume that the sensitive data is collected centrally, and processed by
a trusted curator. However, the main examples of diﬀerential privacy
applied in practice - for example in the use of diﬀerential privacy in
Google Chrome’s collection of browsing statistics, or Apple’s training of
predictive messaging in iOS 10 -use a purely local mechanism applied at
the data source, thus avoiding the collection of sensitive data altogether.
While this is a beneﬁt of the local approach, with systems like Apple’s,
users are required to completely trust that the analysis running on their
system has the claimed privacy properties.
In this position paper we outline some key challenges in develop-
ing static analyses for analysing diﬀerential privacy, and propose novel
abstractions for describing the behaviour of probabilistic programs not
previously used in static analyses.
1 Purpose and Aims
Diﬀerential privacy [6] perhaps represents the most rigorous and robust approach
to privacy today. Unlike anonymisation methods which focus on properties of
the data such as ensuring that there are several records with a given attribute,
or that certain ﬁelds have been deleted, it is a property of the general mechanism
(algorithm) used to release the data (and thus independent of the data itself);
an algorithm which inputs sensitive data and outputs public data (typically used
to compute some statistical property if the data) satisﬁes diﬀerential privacy if,
for any input, adding or removing the data for any one individual makes very
little observable diﬀerence to the overall result. For the purpose of this work we
will not delve into the speciﬁc technical details of the deﬁnition.
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2 S. Hunt and D. Sands
Example: Randomized Response. As an example, suppose that a data analyst
wishes to answer the question: what percentage of browser users have visited web-
sites commonly used to facilitate the download of copyrighted material? Suppose
this information can be determined from the browsing history stored in your
browser. One way to give a useful but necessarily approximate answer to this
question, at the same time as limiting the privacy risk for the individual, is to
use the following procedure: each respondent ﬂips two coins; if both are heads
then answer “Yes”, if both are tails then answer “No”, and otherwise answer the
query truthfully. The data analyst is able to make a statistical estimate of the
true percentage: if there are y “Yes” answers from 10000 respondents then we
expect 2500 random “Yes” answers, 2500 random “No” answers, so the answer
to the question can be estimated as (y − 2500)/5000. At the same time, anyone
intercepting a “Yes” answer from any one individual cannot know whether it
was generated by honesty or randomness – even if the response becomes public
data the respondent can plausibly deny having visited such websites. In this
speciﬁc example we can informally think of the increase in privacy risk as a mul-
tiplicative factor of 0.75/0.25 = 3, so if there was already a 0.1% chance of, say,
someone launching an investigation into whether a given IP address has been
used to share copyrighted data, the risk in participation would at most increase
to 3 × 0.1%. By adjusting the probabilities of the coin ﬂips one can increase the
degree of privacy at the expense of either having lower accuracy in the reported
result, or of requiring more data points to compensate for the increased noise.
This algorithm is diﬀerentially private [5]. Diﬀerential privacy is a param-
eterised deﬁnition, and the parameter, referred to as “epsilon”, bounds (the
natural logarithm of) how much multiplicative diﬀerence there is between an
analysis using my data or someone else’s. In the case of this particular algorithm
we would say that it is -diﬀerentially private, with  = ln 3. Every nontrivial dif-
ferentially private algorithm operates by the addition of noise in some form. The
particular algorithm described in the example is based on a 50-year-old survey
technique called randomised response, and was designed to persuade respondents
to tell truthful answers to potentially embarrassing or incriminating questions.
Frameworks for Diﬀerential Privacy. Diﬀerential privacy enjoys a number of use-
ful properties that make it, in theory, an excellent foundation for robust privacy-
aware information release. In particular it satisﬁes a number of useful composi-
tional properties that allow the construction of diﬀerentially private algorithms
from well-behaved data transformations and diﬀerentially private components.
Making use of these, a number of diﬀerential privacy frameworks have emerged
which support the construction of diﬀerentially private mechanisms. These lever-
age general compositional properties of diﬀerential privacy to simplify the static
veriﬁcation or dynamic enforcement of a desired amount of privacy. Examples
of systems of this ilk are,
– PINQ [22], wPINQ [23], ProPer [11], and EKTELO [25] which dynamically
monitor how data is used, and ensure that the computation never exceeds a
given privacy budget, or
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New Program Abstractions for Privacy 3
– Fuzz [13,15] and LightDP [26] where programs are written in a language
with a custom type system or special veriﬁcation annotations, and where
static type checking/veriﬁcation provides diﬀerential privacy guarantees.
Fig. 1. Centralised Model (ﬁgure
from [10])
Fig. 2. Local Model (ﬁg. from [10])
All of these frameworks focus on veriﬁ-
cation of mechanisms which are assumed to
have access to the whole data set. This implies
the existence of a trusted database curator
who holds the sensitive data, and who has
the responsibility to apply the mechanism to
the data and to keep track of a global privacy
risk (Fig. 1). We refer to this as the centralised
model.
Local Diﬀerential Privacy. The randomised
response mechanism described above has a
diﬀerent trust model, and is called local dif-
ferential privacy [4,19] or simply “the local
model” [7]. In the local model the privacy
mechanism is applied locally, at each respon-
dent (Fig. 2).
The local model beneﬁts from the fact that
there is no longer a need to centrally store
sensitive data – privacy is managed at the
source (your cell-phone, car, web browser. . . ).
This removes the need for a trusted curator,
and lowers the security risk of data breach.
Perhaps for these reasons, the local model is
the ﬂavour of diﬀerential privacy which was
ﬁrst to be used in the actual “real-world”
instances of diﬀerential privacy, by Google (in
the Chrome browser) [12] and Apple (in iOS
10 and MacOS) [1].
Research Goals
The local analyses by Apple and Google require a great deal of trust on the part
of the user: you have to trust that they implemented their algorithms correctly
on your device, and that the algorithms are indeed diﬀerentially private, not
just for a single round of communication, but even when statistics are reported
over time. Apple, in particular, did not initially report on the intended quantity
of privacy (“epsilon”) secret, and a recent reverse-engineering study of their
algorithms [24] suggests that this trust is not well founded, and concludes
“We call for Apple to make its implementation of privacy-preserving algo-
rithms public and to make the rate of privacy loss fully transparent and
tuneable by the user”
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This comment aligns well with what we view as key design criteria for a frame-
work for local diﬀerential privacy: the diﬀerential privacy properties of the
mechanisms which deliver results based on sensitive data should be statically
veriﬁable, and the veriﬁcation should be simple enough to be done on the ﬂy,
for example in the respondent’s device.
In rest of this paper we outline some key problems and possibilities in working
towards statically veriﬁable local diﬀerential privacy. Most prior general frame-
works for enforcing or verifying diﬀerential privacy are focused on the centralised
model of a trusted curator providing access to a raw database. In Sect. 2 we out-
line one approach to veriﬁable local diﬀerential privacy, PreTPost, due to Ebadi
and Sands [10], and discuss its limitations.
The limitations of PreTPost motivate a more general static analysis app-
roach. We follow the philosophy outlined by Malacaria in factoring a quantitative
information ﬂow (QIF) analysis via a dependency analysis: [21]:
“〈the lattice of information〉 allows for an elegant analysis decomposition of
QIF into two steps, the ﬁrst being an algebraic interpretation, the second
being a numerical evaluation”
The “algebraic interpretation” referred to here is the use of equivalence relations,
dubbed “the lattice of information” [20], but also known (in a more general form)
as the lattice of partial equivalence relations where it was ﬁrst used by the authors
to express static analysis of dependency, referred to as a “binding time analysis”
in [17], and as a “constancy analysis” in [16].
The gist of the approach articulated by Malacaria is to ﬁrst determine which
public outputs depend on which sensitive inputs, and then to instantiate that
dependency numerically as a quantity. In our setting the quantity we want to
measure is the epsilon of diﬀerential privacy: a bound on the largest proportional
change in probability of obtaining any particular output when the user’s sensitive
input data is changed.
To this end we outline some speciﬁc challenges and opportunities in realising
this programme for (local) diﬀerential privacy.
In Sect. 3 we discuss a shortcoming in dependency analyses that leads to
imprecision in the quantitative step, namely the inability to describe a disjunc-
tive dependency (to depend on one thing in some executions, or another thing
in others, but never both in the same execution). This turns out to be a crucial
distinction for properties such as diﬀerential privacy, because it allows us to use
max rather than sum when we perform the quantitative instantiation step.
In Sect. 4 we propose a new way to instantiate privacy cost. Rather than
directly instantiating with diﬀerential privacy costs (or their logarithm), our pro-
posal is to abstract the behaviour of probabilistic programs (i.e. a new abstract
domain) in a way which will provide greater precision and versatility; it is based
on the idea of a geometric interpretation of diﬀerential privacy, a privacy region
introduced by Kairouz, Oh, and Viswanath [18].
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New Program Abstractions for Privacy 5
2 Veriﬁable Local Diﬀerential Privacy
PreTPost is a framework for implementing veriﬁable local diﬀerential privacy
[10]. PreTPost leverages the simple observation that local diﬀerential privacy is
preserved by arbitrary data pre-processing. The PreTPost framework requires a
data analysis to be decomposed into a pre-processor (Pre), a simple core prob-
abilistic transformation (T), and a post-processor (Post) (Fig. 3).
Pre-processor
local
sensitive
data
Randomising 
Transformation
Post-
Processor
Response
Fig. 3. PreTPost schema
The point of this schema is that an analysis delivered to a respondent in the
form of a 〈Pre, T,Post〉 triple can be easily analysed: the quantity of diﬀeren-
tial privacy, often just referred to as “epsilon” but what we will refer to as the
privacy cost, can be bounded by the cost of T alone since, unlike in the case of
centralised diﬀerential privacy, the pre-processing cannot inﬂate the privacy cost
of a subsequent diﬀerentially private operation. It is shown that this decomposi-
tion is possible and straightforward for a range of local analysis algorithms from
the literature. Ebadi has implemented a prototype implementation of the PreT-
Post framework using sandboxed execution to prevent a malicious pre-processor
from communicating the sensitive data directly, from bypassing the randomising
transformation, or communicating via a covert timing channel [9].
Limitations of PreTPost. While the PreTPost schema provides a simple route
to analysis of a proposed diﬀerentially private data processing algorithm, there
are some limitations:
– The proposed algorithm must be refactored into the PreTPost format, which
might not be the most natural way to express the algorithm.
– In practice (including in the PreTPost implementation) there are not only
sensitive inputs, but also public inputs from other sources (data which is
not considered sensitive) such as local data, as well as local public outputs
(which may be used to modify subsequent public inputs). Although we don’t
anticipate major problems with these generalisations, they are still outside
the simple schema of PreTPost.
– It cannot account for algorithms which reduce the sensitivity of the input
data. For example, suppose an algorithm works by bitwise randomisation
of a bit vector generated by a pre-processing of the sensitive input. If pre-
processing yields an n-bit vector in which only a ﬁxed number of bits k depend
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6 S. Hunt and D. Sands
on the sensitive data, then the privacy cost is k times the cost associated
with the randomisation, whereas PreTPost necessarily assumes all n bits are
sensitive; this example is reminiscent of the Bloom ﬁlter used in the full
Rappor system [12];
– it cannot account for repeated randomisation (also a feature of the full Rappor
system), i.e., where some randomised data is further randomised (not a com-
mon operation in diﬀerentially private algorithms, but used by the Rappor
system).
While it is not clear the extent to which these limitations are show stoppers
for PreTPost, by developing a more general and expressive static analysis that
is not based on a ﬁxed program schema we aim to gain a more fundamental
understanding of the problem of abstracting and verifying diﬀerentially private
algorithms. The remaining sections discuss some of the building blocks for such
an analysis.
3 Dependency Analysis: The Need for Disjunction
Our aim is to address the limitations of PreTPost described above, in part
by using dependency analysis to deal with the complex and subtle inter-
dependencies that arise in realistic implementations and which prevent a simple,
clean separation into three phases. However, it turns out that to get good results
we need a semantic notion of dependency that is more expressive than the one
used in standard dependency analyses. Moreover, this richer notion of depen-
dency is relevant and potentially useful even when a mechanism can be cleanly
separated in PreTPost style.
In this section we outline why we need a more general notion (a notion of
disjunction), and how this might be represented in an analysis. We do not,
however, go into the details of the semantic model for this generalised form,
which is work in progress.
As it stands, PreTPost has nothing to say about how the post-processing
phase uses the data supplied by the probabilistic transformation T . While post-
processing the outputs of T can never increase their privacy cost, it can decrease
it. Consider the code in Figs. 4, 5 and 6. Taken together these pieces of code deﬁne
three alternative versions of a mechanism we call Three-Bits, which processes
a 3-bit private value (an integer between 0 and 7, stored in x) and outputs a
randomised result in y. All three versions share the same pre-processing and
probabilistic phases but diﬀer in their post-processing. The Pre-phase projects
out the three bits of x into a, b, c and the T-phase independently randomises
the bits. Suppose that the privacy cost of Ran is .
Post-processing (A) simply reassembles the randomised bits into a new 3-bit
integer. Version (B) does the same but neglects to include bit b. Version (C)
includes bit a in the result and, depending on a, includes either b or c, but never
both together.
A standard dependency analysis will infer that, after (A), y depends on all
three of a, b, c whereas after (B) it depends on a and c but not b. This allows
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a = x % 2 ;
b = (x/2) % 2 ;
c = (x/4) % 2 ;
Fig. 4. Three-Bits: Pre
a = Ran( a ) ;
b = Ran(b ) ;
c = Ran( c ) ;
Fig. 5. Three-Bits: T
y = a + 2∗b + 4∗ c ;
(A)
y = a + 4∗ c ;
(B)
i f ( a == 0)
y = a + 2∗b ;
e l s e
y = a + 4∗ c ;
(C)
Fig. 6. Three-Bits: Post
us to infer that the privacy cost for Three-Bits-A is the sum of the costs for a,
b, c (a total of 3) but the privacy cost for Three-Bits-B is the sum only of the
costs for a and c (a total of 2).
Now consider (C). A standard dependency analysis will infer that, as for
(A), y depends on a, b, c and an analysis using this dependency information
would therefore also assign a privacy cost of 3 to Three-Bits-C. But this is
overly conservative. On any given run of (C), the value of y reveals either the
values of a and c, or the values of a andc, but never all three together. This
disjunctive dependency behaviour is reﬂected in the true privacy cost of Three-
Bits-C, which is only 2. More generally, for a disjunctive dependency it turns
out to be sound for diﬀerential privacy to take the maximum cost across the
disjuncts, rather than the sum. Hence the cost for (C) may be calculated as
max(cost(a) + cost(b), cost(a) + cost(c)) = 2, in contrast with the cost for (A)
which is cost(a) + cost(b) + cost(c) = 3.
A standard dependency analysis assigns to each output variable y a depen-
dency set of input variables on which it may depend, ie a set X such that any
choice of initial values for the variables in X completely determines the resulting
value of y. Example (C) suggests that for our purposes it might be natural to
lift such an analysis to represent a disjunctive dependency by a set of sets of
variables. The dependency for y could then be represented as
{{a, b}, {a, c}}
Adapting standard approaches from abstract interpretation ([3,14]) it is rela-
tively straightforward to lift an existing dependency analysis in this way (though
the resulting algorithmic complexity may present practical challenges). However,
it is not immediately obvious how to give a satisfactory semantics to such a set
of sets. In particular, the required semantics is not simple logical disjunction of
dependency properties: in example (C) it is neither true that the value of y is
determined solely by {a, b} nor that it is determined solely by {a, c}.
Our work in progress suggests that a satisfactory semantics for disjunctive
dependency is obtainable by generalising the usual non-interference condition in
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8 S. Hunt and D. Sands
an appropriate way. We conclude this section with some hints at the direction
in which we are aiming.
The standard non-interference condition can give meaning to e.g., “output x
depends on inputs y and z” by using equivalence relations over states (mappings
from variables to values). For this example we need two such relations, ={x},
which relates two stores if they agree on the value of variable x, and ={y,z},
which relates two stores if they agree on the values of both y and z. Then the
semantics of “output x depends on inputs y and z” is: when the program is run
on two stores related by ={y,z}, you end up with two stores related by ={x}.
While there are speciﬁc relations within the full lattice of equivalence rela-
tions on stores that exhibit disjunctive dependencies such as “output x depends
on y and z or y and w”, they can only express such a disjunction by saying
exactly how it arises. For example we could build an equivalence relation on
input stores that allows us to express the more speciﬁc disjunction “when p(y)
then x depends on y and z but otherwise it depends on y and w”. What we are
aiming for is a method that will allow us to give a semantics for such a disjunc-
tion more abstractly, directly from the relations ={y,z} and ={y,w}, by working
with suitable sets of relations that take into account all the ways that such a
disjunction might arise.
4 The Abstract Domain of Privacy Regions
As mentioned in the introduction, for the quantitative phase of our analysis,
we propose a novel abstract domain for analysis of probabilistic programs based
on the idea of privacy regions. A key design goal is to allow us to leverage the
framework of abstract interpretation [2]. Recall that abstract interpretation is a
framework for semantics-based analysis which works by interpreting programs
over an abstract domain in place of the concrete (standard) semantic domain,
where each abstract value a denotes a concrete property γa. Each program con-
struct is then given an abstract interpretation which soundly approximates its
standard semantics: if a is mapped to a′, the standard semantics transforms the
property γa to some property P ⊆ γa′. The abstract semantics of a program
is then computed by a ﬁxed-point iteration. The abstract domain is typically
required to be a complete lattice and the design of the framework ensures that
it is always sound to over-approximate by computing abstract values higher in
the lattice. This freedom may be used (at the cost of reduced precision) to force
the ﬁxed-point iteration to converge within an acceptable time limit. Here, we
give a lightweight, simpliﬁed account of the idea of privacy regions and explain
why they have the appropriate structure to serve as an abstract domain.
To motivate the deﬁnitions we need to recall the generalisation of diﬀeren-
tial privacy known as approximate or (, δ)-diﬀerential privacy. In this variant
(equivalent to -DP when δ = 0) one weakens the requirement so that the dif-
ferential privacy property may fail with some probability (typically very small)
given by δ. This weakening can be used to obtain much better accuracy when
composing analyses.
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Fig. 7. (, δ) privacy region Fig. 8. Example privacy region
A key observation of [18] is that the (, δ)-diﬀerential privacy properties
enjoyed by a mechanism can be characterised geometrically. For each choice of
(, δ) deﬁne its privacy region1 to be the closed region of the unit square above
the line x = y and below the line y = ex+ δ as pictured in Fig. 7. Suppose that
M has domain A and range B (ie M maps each value in A to a distribution over
B). Then M is (, δ)-DP iﬀ the following set is contained in the (, δ) privacy
region:
{(x, y) | a, a′ ∈ A,S ⊆ B, x = Pr[M(a) ∈ S], y = Pr[M(a′) ∈ S], y ≥ x} (*)
(Note that any such set is symmetrical about y = 1 − x, because Pr[M(a) ∈
S] = 1 − Pr[M(a) ∈ S]).
The privacy region for M , denoted R(M), is then deﬁned as the intersection
of all the (, δ) privacy regions such that M is (, δ)-DP, ie all the (, δ) privacy
regions which contain the set (*). Equivalently, and more constructively, we can
deﬁne R(M) to be the convex closure of (*): an example of a privacy region
for a mechanism (speciﬁed as a stochastic matrix) is given in Fig. 8, where the
points generated by this construction are marked. Note that each upper edge of a
privacy region R(M) witnesses a distinct (, δ)-DP property, where  is the log of
the gradient and δ is the y-intercept; all of these properties hold simultaneously
for M (and, indeed, for any mechanism whose privacy region is contained in
R(M)). In this example, the three upper edges witness the properties ( =
ln 4, δ = 0), ( = 0, δ = 1/4), and ( = ln(1/4), δ = 3/4). (The two vertices of
the middle edge – (1/12, 4/12) and (8/12, 11/12) – are generated by the output
events {Yes} and {No,Maybe}, respectively.)
1 For convenience, our deﬁnition is a rotation by 90◦ in the unit square of the region
deﬁned by [18] and we restrict to the region above y = x (their deﬁnition, after
rotation, is symmetric about y = x).
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Our key proposal is that the set of privacy regions forms a suitable abstract
domain for static program analysis based on the principles of abstract interpre-
tation (as outlined at the start of this section):
1. Privacy regions form a complete lattice ordered by subset inclusion, with the
bottom element represented by the line x = y ((0, 0)-diﬀerential privacy)
and top element being the upper left half of the unit square (no diﬀerential
privacy), and the meet and join given by intersection and convex closure of
the union, respectively.
2. The semantic content of a privacy region is all the (, δ)-regions in which it
is contained, so any R ⊇ R(M) which can be inferred by analysis is a safe
approximation for M .
3. Privacy regions subsume the notion of distance between distributions (as
used in pure -DP): the “leading edge” of a privacy region (rising from (0, 0))
deﬁnes an (, δ)-DP property where δ = 0 and, by convexity, where  is
maximal.
4. Even when  is the only property of interest, the extra information carried by
privacy regions provides a better abstraction, yielding a more precise bound
on  than can be obtained using distance alone.
5. [18] provides a variety of useful results that characterise privacy regions,
in particular describing the privacy region of a mechanism built from the
composition of multiple mechanisms – very natural operations in a static
program analysis.
6. We have been able to construct novel abstractions of function composition
and pairing, which are essential ingredients of a static analysis.
7. There are many natural ways to safely coarsen a privacy region (to make it
bigger, and thus less precise) – something which is a prerequisite to approxi-
mating ﬁxed-point computations necessary to abstract the behaviour of iter-
ative or recursive computation.
5 Conclusions
We have identiﬁed two key steps in our goal of constructing a static analysis of
local diﬀerential privacy: the ability to abstract disjunctive dependency prop-
erties, and the use of privacy regions as an abstract domain for privacy cost.
We have a promising approach for the semantics of disjunctive dependency, and
believe this could be of independent interest. It remains, of course, to show that
this can be combined with privacy regions to perform a useful static analysis.
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